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It is afair summary of history to say that the safeguards of liberty have
1
frequently been forged in controversies involving not very nice people.
Felix Frankfurter, Associate Justice, U. S. Supreme Court
I. INTRODUCTION

Terrorism, a reality of life in many countries, is on the rise in the
United States and abroad. One effective tool in the fight against
terrorism is the little known, but increasingly publicized, Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act ("FISA").2 The secret warrants
authorized by this Act are an important source of foreign intelligence
information, which pursuant to statute sometimes becomes evidence
for use by law enforcement personnel.' For example, FISA warrants
produced information leading to the capture in 1992 of KGB mole
Aldrich H. Ames;4 information on Aum Shinrikyo, the Japanese
religious cult responsible for attacking the Tokyo subway system with
sarin gas in 1995; and critical evidence in the 1996 World Trade
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1. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
2. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1862 (2000).
3. Id. § 1806(c)-(d).
4. Brian Duffy, The Cold War's Last Spy: The Bizarre and Untold Story of How the FBI
Caught KGB Mole Aldrich Ames, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Mar. 6, 1995, 1995 WL
3113424.
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Center bombing.' While the statute is argued by some to be an
affront to personal liberties, it recognizes the important need in
certain, specified situations, for surreptitious surveillance. However,
recent historic decisions by the statutorily created FISA courts may
jeopardize both the future of the Act and an effective and necessary
weapon in the arsenal against terror.
The cases that are the subject of this Note address coordination
between law enforcement and foreign intelligence officials, a practice
critical to the war on terrorism and the pursuit of espionage.
What is at stake is nothing less than our ability to protect this
country from foreign spies and terrorists. When we identify a
spy or a terrorist, we have to pursue a coordinated, integrated,
coherent response. We need all of our best people, intelligence
and law enforcement alike, working together to neutralize the
threat. In some cases, the best protection is prosecution-like
the recent prosecution of Robert Hanssen for espionage. In
other cases, prosecution is a bad idea, and another methodsuch as recruitment-is called for. Sometimes you need to use
both methods. But we can't make a rational decision until
everyone is allowed to sit down together and brainstorm about
what to do. That is what we are seeking.6
Such coordination has historically been forbidden under FISA.7
Prohibiting that interaction is one way in which the statute seeks to
balance individual liberties while providing the government the ability
to conduct surreptitious surveillances, an invaluable tool in terrorism
and espionage investigations.
Following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and the
subsequent passage of the Uniting and Strengthening America by
Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Interrupt and Obstruct
Terrorism Act of 2001 (Patriot Act),8 U.S. Attorney General John
Ashcroft established procedures allowing for greater sharing and
coordination between foreign intelligence and law enforcement
officials regarding FISA surveillance. This action resulted in the
5. Vernon Loeb, Anti-Terrorism Powers Grow; 'Roving' Wiretaps, Secret Court Orders Used
to Hunt Suspects, THE WASHINGTON POST, Jan. 29, 1999, at A23, 1999 WL 2196673.
6. The USA PatriotAct in Practice:Shedding Light on the FISA Process: HearingBefore the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,107th Cong. (2002) (statement of David S. Kris, Assoc. Deputy
Attorney General) (transcript available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=398&
wit-id).
7. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1863 (2000).
8. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (Patriot Act), Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272.
The Act was passed to "deter and punish terrorist acts in the United States and around the
world, to enhance law enforcement investigatory tools, and for other purposes." Id.
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Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Court of Review (Review Court)
convening for the first time in November 2002. This court, first
provided for by FISA twenty-five years ago,9 heard a Justice
Department appeal of a ruling by FISA's lower court (Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court, or FISC) prohibiting the increased
coordination between foreign intelligence and law enforcement
officials desired by the Attorney General. In its first decision, the
Review Court exceeded the scope of review necessary to dispose of the
case. The court's overly broad adjudication has opened the door to
attacks against FISA and may undermine the statute as an effective
tool in the war on terrorism and the protection of national security.
A. The ForeignIntelligence SurveillanceAct
Since 1978, U.S. intelligence agencies have utilized FISA as a
tool to collect information crucial to national security via clandestine
surveillances and searches of spies and terrorists. ° The FISC is a
specialized tribunal established under FISA to review warrant
applications for surreptitious electronic surveillance through which the
government seeks to obtain foreign intelligence information. " FISA
warrants are not subject to the traditional probable cause requirement
for criminal investigations.' 2 Instead, in recognition of the severity of
the foreign threat and the difficulty in obtaining foreign intelligence
information, a FISA warrant can be obtained where the target of the
electronic surveillance is an agent of a foreign power, and the targeted
facility is, or is about to be, used by a foreign agent.' 3 While the FISC
has presided over thousands of such warrant applications, the court
never in its history issued a published opinion regarding its highly
secretive proceedings until May 2002.14
Congress passed FISA to resolve the question of the applicability
of the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement to electronic
surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes and to provide certainty

9. 50 U.S.C. § 1803(b) (2000).
10. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1862 (1978). FISA, as enacted in 1978, provided for applications
and orders pertaining to electronic surveillance. Id. §§ 1801-1811. In 1994, the statute was
amended to permit applications and orders authorizing physical searches. Pub. L. No. 103-359,
108 Stat. 3423 (Oct. 14, 1994) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1821-1829). The procedures
governing FISA physical searches and electronic surveillance are similar.
11. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1802, 1803(a) (2000).
12. Id. § 1805(a)(3)(A)-(B).

13. Id. § 1805(a)(3).
14. In re All Matters Submitted to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, 218 F.
Supp. 2d 611 (Foreign Intel. Surv. Ct. 2002).
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as to the lawfulness of such surveillance."5 FISA provides for court
orders and other procedural safeguards that, in Congress' judgment,
"are necessary to insure that electronic surveillance by the U.S.
Government within this country conforms to the fundamental
principles of the [F]ourth [A]mendment.", 6 The statute was an
attempt to devise a "secure framework by which the executive branch
may conduct legitimate electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence
purposes within the context of this Nation's commitment to privacy
and individual rights. ,17
Specifically, FISA establishes a statutory procedure whereby a
federal officer, if authorized by the President of the United States
acting through the Attorney General, may obtain a judicial warrant
from the specially created FISC "approving electronic surveillance of a
foreign power or an agent of a foreign power for the purpose of
The issuance of a
obtaining foreign intelligence information. '"18
warrant under FISA is not governed by traditional probable cause
standards; a federal officer acting under the authority of the President
need only demonstrate probable cause that the target is a foreign
power or a foreign agentY In the case of U.S. citizens and resident
aliens, the President, or officials designated by the President, must
demonstrate that the government is not clearly erroneous in believing
that the information sought is the desired foreign intelligence
information, and that the information cannot be reasonably obtained
by normal methods.2"
The statute empowers the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court to
designate eleven judges to hear the requests for foreign intelligence
warrants and develop expertise in this area of law.2 1 The FISA statute
also provides for a three-member court with jurisdiction to review the
denial of any FISA warrant application. This court of review never
convened in FISA's entire history until fall 2002, when the
government, pursuant to the FISA statute, moved to have the FISA
lower court's May 2002 decision reviewed.
15. H.R. REP. No. 1283, pt. I, at 25 (1978); United States v. Duggan, 743 F.2d 59, 73 (2d
Cir. 1984).
16. Duggan, 743 F.2d at 73 (quoting S. REP. No. 701, at 13 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3973, 3982).
17. Id. at 73 (quoting S. REP. No. 604, at 15 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3904,
3916).
18. 50 U.S.C. §1802(b) (2000).
19. Id. § 1804(a)(4)(A).
20. Id. §§ 1804(a)(7)(E), 1805(a)(5).
21. Id. § 1803(a). This provision was amended in 2001, raising the number of judges from
seven to eleven. 50 U.S.C. § 1803(a) (2003).
22. 50 U.S.C. § 1803(b).
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Moreover, for more than twenty years, U.S. Circuit Courts of
Appeals, when hearing cases reliant on evidence obtained via FISA
applications, have repeatedly and unanimously upheld this highly
In reaching their
secretive, non-adversarial warrant process. 3
decisions, the circuit courts have ruled that FISA provides for a
justifiable imposition on private rights where the "primary purpose"
of the warrants has been to gather foreign intelligence information in
the interest of national security, and not to further a criminal
prosecution .24
B. The Events Leading to the FISA Review Court's First Opinion
In response to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attack on the
World Trade Center, the worst foreign attack against the United
States in history, Congress passed the Patriot Act. One provision of
the Patriot Act, which provides broad new powers for law enforcement
and intelligence personnel in the fight against terrorism, lowered the
Under the
standard under which a FISA warrant can issue.
significant"
"a
if
be
obtained
can
warrant
FISA
a
amendments,
purpose of the electronic surveillance is to gather foreign intelligence.26
Prior to the amendments, a FISA warrant could only issue if "the
purpose" of the surveillance was to gather foreign intelligence.27
This seemingly small change in wording has potentially great
impact. FISA's relaxed probable cause requirement was previously
preserved for situations where the only purpose was foreign
intelligence gathering. The new wording allows the government to
avoid the normal probable cause required to obtain a warrant in a
criminal investigation and, instead, seek a warrant under FISA if the
government is able to show a concurrent foreign intelligence purpose.
Based on the broader powers available under the Patriot Act
amendments to FISA, Attorney General Ashcroft promulgated new
intelligence sharing procedures, incorporating this lower standard,
increasing the sharing of foreign intelligence information with criminal
21
prosecutors, and expanding prosecutors' roles in the FISA process.
23. See, e.g., United States v. Duggan, 743 F.2d 59 (2d Cir. 1984); United States v. Badia,
827 F.2d 1458 (11th Cir. 1987); United States v. Johnson, 952 F.2d 565 (1st Cir. 1991).
24. See Duggan, 743 F.2d at 77; Badia, 827 F.2d at 1463-64; Johnson, 952 F.2d at 572-73.
25. 50 U.S.C. § 1804.
26. Id. § 1804(a)(7)(B).
27. Pub. L. 107-56, § 218.
28. Memorandum of Intelligence Sharing Procedures for Foreign Intelligence and Foreign
Counterintelligence Investigations Conducted by the FBI from the Attorney General, to the FBI
Director, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, Counsel for Intelligence Policy, and
United States Attorneys (Mar. 6, 2002) (filed Mar. 7, 2002), 2002 WL 1949259 (Foreign Intel.
Surv. Ct.) [hereinafter Memorandum of Intelligence Sharing Procedures].
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The Attorney General considered the ability of intelligence and law
enforcement officials to share a "full and free exchange of information
and ideas" critical in light of the "overriding need to protect the
national security from foreign threats. ' 29 In addition to procedures
directed at total information sharing, the March 2002 procedures
(2002 procedures) also allow prosecutors to advise the FBI regarding a
foreign intelligence investigation, including advice on the use of
FISA. 3' This type of consultation is justified as "necessary to the
ability of the United States to coordinate efforts to investigate and
protect against foreign threats to national security."3 1 Such sharing
was previously limited under FISA, and prosecutors were barred from
directing and controlling FISA applications.3 2 These new guidelines
formed the dispute resulting in the FISC's first-ever published
33
opinion in May 2002.
Prior to the Attorney General's dissemination of the new
guidelines, the FISC adopted the Attorney General's 1995 intelligence
sharing procedures (1995 procedures) as "minimization" and "wall"
procedures in all cases before the FISC.34 Minimization procedures
are designed to limit the gathering, retention, and dissemination of
non-public information obtained through FISA surveillance.3" Wall
procedures focus on preserving separation between FISA surveillances
and criminal investigations. 36 The FISC's historic opinion addressed
29. Brief for the United States at 15, In re Sealed Case, 310 F. 3d 717 (Foreign Intel. Surv.
Ct. 2002) (No. 02-001).
30. Id.
31. Id. at 16.
32. 50 U.S.C. § 1801(h) (2000); In re All Matters Submitted to the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court, Amended Order, 1995 WL 1946628, at *2 (Foreign Intel. Surv. Ct. May 17,
1995).
33. In re All Matters Submitted to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, 218 F.
Supp. 2d 611 (Foreign Intel. Surv. Ct. 2002).
34. Id. at 615,620.
35. A FISC judge may approve electronic surveillance if he finds that proposed
minimization procedures meet the requirements of § 1801(h) of the Act. 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a)(4)
(2000). The statute defines "minimization procedures" as:
(1) specific procedures, which shall be adopted by the Attorney General, that are
reasonably designed in light of the purpose and technique of the particular
surveillance, to minimize the acquisition and retention, and prohibit the
dissemination, of nonpublicly available information concerning unconsenting United
States persons consistent with the need of the Unites States to obtain, produce, and
disseminate foreign intelligence information; ....
Id. § 1801(h)(1).
36. The FISC explained "wall" procedures as follows:
In order to preserve both the appearance and the fact that FISA surveillances and
searches were not being used sub rosa for criminal investigations, the Court routinely
approved the use of information screening "walls" proposed by the government in its
applications. Under the normal "wall" procedures, where there were separate
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the Justice Department's motion before the FISC to vacate the FISC's
adoption of the 1995 procedures.37 Further, the Justice Department
sought approval of the new intelligence sharing procedures created
after Congress' amendment of the statute in the Patriot Act.3" The
government claimed expanded power to use FISA electronic
surveillance in criminal investigations due to amendments of FISA
contained in the Patriot Act.39 The government's drive to implement
the proposed procedures evinced its desire for increased intelligence
sharing and more consultations between federal law enforcement and
intelligence officers conducting electronic surveillance following the
post-September 11th Patriot Act amendments to FISA.4"
Technically, the FISC granted the government's motion.
However, the court ordered the proposed 2002 procedures modified in
one significant way,4' amounting to a denial for purposes of
establishing an issue for review. The government's FISA warrant
application proposed that electronic surveillance of a target be
authorized on certain terms, and the FISC's May order rejected the
most critical of those terms.
The FISC additionally imposed
restrictions on the government's investigation:
[L]aw enforcement officials shall not make recommendations to
intelligence officials concerning the initiation, operation,
continuation or expansion of FISA searches or surveillances.
Additionally, the FBI and the Criminal Division [of the

intelligence and criminal investigations, or a single counter-espionage investigation
with overlapping intelligence and criminal interests, FBI criminal investigators and
Department prosecutors were not allowed to review all of the raw FISA intercepts or
seized materials lest they become defacto partners in the FISA surveillances and
searches. Instead, a screening mechanism, or person, usually the chief legal counsel in
an FBI field office, or an assistant U.S. attorney not involved in the overlapping
criminal investigation, would review all of the raw intercepts and seized materials and
pass on only that information which might be relevant evidence. In unusual cases
such as where attorney-client intercepts occurred, Justice Department lawyers in
OIPR acted as the "wall."
In significant cases, involving major complex
investigations such as the bombings of the U.S. Embassies in Africa, and the
millennium investigations, where criminal investigations of FISA targets were being
conducted concurrently, and prosecution was likely, this Court became the "wall" so
that FISA information could not be disseminated to criminal prosecutors without the
Court's approval.
In re All Matters Submitted to Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, 218 F. Supp. 2d at 620.
37. Id. at611-27.
38. Id. at 613.
39. Id. at 622-24.
40. Id. at 623; see also Brief for the United States at 3, In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717
(Foreign Intel. Surv. Ct. Rev. 2002) (No. 02-001).
41. In re All Matters Submitted to ForeignIntelligence Surveillance Court, 218 F. Supp. 2d at
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Department of Justice] shall ensure that law enforcement
officials do not direct or control the use of the FISA procedures
to enhance criminal prosecution, and that advice intended to
preserve the option of a criminal prosecution does not
inadvertently result in the Criminal Division's directing or
controlling the investigation using FISA searches and
surveillances toward law enforcement objectives.42
In its decision, the court also provided for a "chaperone"
requirement consisting of joint meetings to ensure that the Justice
Department followed the procedures.43 Despite the government's
motivation to protect the nation from international terrorism by
allowing for greater sharing between law enforcement and intelligence
officers, the FISC found the proposed policy, which "allows FISA to
be used primarily for a law enforcement purpose," inconsistent with
FISA's mission to "obtain, produce and disseminate foreign intelligence
information as mandated in [§§] 1801(h) and 1821(4). ' 'a4 The FISC,
therefore, ordered the modifications.4" The principal modification
precluded Justice Department prosecutors from directing and
controlling the FISA process, while permitting substantial
coordination between intelligence and law enforcement officials,
reinstating the bright line provided by the 1995 procedures.46
Dissatisfied, the Justice Department filed an historic appeal to
the FISA Review Court,47 and this time the Justice Department's
guidelines and interpretation of the statute were upheld.4 ' The FISA
Review Court concluded that FISA, as amended by the Patriot Act,

42. Id. at 625.
43. Id. at 626.
44. Id. at 623 (first emphasis added; portion of original emphasis omitted). The statutes
referenced provide for minimization procedures with respect to electronic surveillance and
physical searches. See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801(h), 1821(4) (2000). The FISC clarifies that:
[T]he Court has long approved, under controlled circumstances, the sharing of FISA
information with criminal prosecutors, as well as consultations between intelligence
and criminal investigations where FISA surveillances and searches are being
conducted. However, the proposed 2002 minimization procedures eliminate the
bright line in the 1995 procedures prohibiting direction and control by prosecutors on
which the Court has relied to moderate the broad acquisition retention, and
dissemination of FISA information in overlapping intelligence and criminal
investigations.
In re All Matters Submitted to Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, 218 F. Supp. 2d at 621-22.

45. Id. at 625.
46. Id. at 625-27.
47. FISA provided for a Court of Review when the act was originally passed in 1978. 50
U.S.C. § 1803(b) (2000). However, this tribunal had never convened prior to the appeal that is
the subject of this Note.
48. In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 719-20 (Foreign Intel. Surv. Ct. Rev. 2002).
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supports the government's position.4 9 The court held that the
restrictions imposed by the FISC on intelligence sharing and direction
and control by prosecutors are not required by the FISA statutes.50
Additionally, the court held that the statute as amended is
constitutional."1 The Review Court further concluded that even prior
to amendment neither the language of FISA nor its legislative history
required such restrictions.5 2 The Review Court's broad holding has
laid the foundation for a defendant to challenge FISA's limited
discovery provisions and the statute's constitutionality as amended.
In its first-ever decision since the passage of FISA, the FISA
Review Court could have adequately disposed of the appeal by simply
finding that the FISC did not have the power to modify the 2002
procedures submitted by the Justice Department. However, the
Review Court was not so restrained. 3 Instead, the court unnecessarily
disposed of three additional issues and thereby jeopardized FISA's
usefulness as a tool to fight terrorism and protect national security. 4
First, the court examined and disposed of an issue not presented to the
FISC: whether the government was restricted under FISA before the
passage of the Patriot Act in its use of foreign intelligence information
in criminal prosecutions."5 Second, the Review Court addressed
whether the Patriot Act amendments eliminated the "primary
purpose" test requirement for approving warrants under FISA."6
Third, the Review Court analyzed the constitutionality of FISA as
amended by the Patriot Act, specifically inquiring whether the Fourth
Amendment requires the "primary purpose" test.57
The ramifications of the broad Review Court opinion are
disturbing. First, in needlessly analyzing the verity of the pre-Patriot
Act limitation in FISA restricting the government's use of foreign
intelligence information in criminal prosecutions, the Review Court
undermines consistent U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals precedent."
Inconsistent with the government interpretation of the amended
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 727.
53. While not the subject of this Note, the author wonders whether the broad scope the
FISA Review Court took in its disposition of this case was an intentional attempt to garner
attention for the first-ever convening of this court and motivated by the court's desire to establish
itself as an authoritative tribunal.
54. The Review Court states that it felt it was error for the FISA lower court to not address
these issues, but interestingly, does not say why. Id. at 732.
55. Id. at 721-22.
56. Id. at 722.

57. Id.
58. See id. at 725-27.
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statute, this precedent requires that the "primary purpose" of FISA
surveillance not be criminal prosecution. 9 Second, the Review
Court's opinion, including its negative analysis of existing precedent,
identifies a defendant's argument for access to previously
undiscoverable FISA application materials.6" The potential success of
such an argument is exacerbated by the copious publicity this sensitive
area of law received following the Justice Department's decision to
pursue this appeal on such expansive terms, and the FISA Review
Court's historic and overbroad opinion.6' Finally, the Review Court
decision makes plain the grounds on which a defendant can attack the
constitutionality of FISA as amended; a question that the Review
Court, despite its analysis of the issue, admits has no definitive
jurisprudential answer."
Part II of this Note will outline the history preceding the passage
of FISA, including a discussion of the cases from which the "primary
purpose test" arose. The Note will then explore the language of the
FISA statute, and the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals' continuing
reliance on the "primary purpose" test in the analysis of cases decided
following the passage of FISA. Following a discussion of the historic
FISC and FISA Review Court opinions in Parts III and IV, including
an articulation of the Patriot Act amendments to FISA, Part V of the
Note will focus on the ramifications of the Review Court's

59. United States v. Duggan, 743 F.2d 59, 77 (2d Cir. 1984); United States v. Badia, 827
F.2d 1458, 1463-64 (11th Cir. 1987); United States v. Johnson, 952 F.2d 565, 572-73 (1st Cir.

1991); United States v. Sarkissian, 841 F.2d 959, 965 (9th Cir. 1988).
60. See In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 725-27 (Foreign Intel. Surv. Ct. Rev. 2002); 50
U.S.C. § 1806(0 (2000).
61. For example, since the Justice Department appealed the FISC ruling in August 2002,
CNN.com has run at least eight stories on the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act and the
recent FISC. See Kelli Arena, The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, CNN.cOM, Aug. 23,
2003, at http://www.cnn.com/2002/LAW/08/23/inv.fisc.explainer/index.html; Kevin Bohn,
ACLU Asks Supreme Court to Hear Appeal of Wiretap Ruling, CNN.COM, Feb. 19, 2003, at
http://www.cnn.com/2003/LAW/02/19/wiretap.appeal/index.html; Kevin Drew, Balancing
Life and Liberty, CNN.COM, Sept. 11, 2002, http://www.cnn.com/2002/LAW/09/10/ar911.
civil.liberties/index.html; Terry Frieden, Appeals Panel Rejects Secret Court's Limits on Terrorist
Wiretaps, CNN.COM, Nov. 19, 2002, http://www.cnn.com/2002/LAW/11/18.spy.court.
ruling/index.html; Justice Appeals Court Ruling Limiting Information Sharing, CNN.COM, Aug.
Anita
23, 2002, at http://www.cnn.com/2002/LAW/08/23/intelligence.ruling/index.html;
Ramasastry, Recent Oregon Ruling on Secret Warrants May Set Troublesome Precedent,
CNN.com, Mar. 18, 2003, at http://www.cnn.com/2003/LAW/03/18/findlaw.analysis.
ramasastry.warrant/index.html; Anita Ramasastry, Spy Court Creates PotentialEnd Run Around
FourthAmendment, CNN.com, Nov. 27, 2002, at http://www.cnn.com/2002/LAW/11/27/
Elaine Shannon, No Way to Secure a
findlaw.analysis.ramasastry.spycourt/index.html;
Homeland?,CNN.com, Aug. 26, 2002, at http://www.cnn.com/2002/LAW/ALL
POLITICS/08/26/time.homeland/index.html.
62. In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 746.
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unnecessarily broad disposition of the appeal, and the potential
dangers that decision poses for the future of FISA.
II. THE HISTORY OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE
ACT

This portion of the Note begins with a review of the judicial
decision that provided the groundwork for FISA. Section B reviews
the origins of the "primary purpose" standard used to review FISA
warrant applications. That standard is compared with the actual
statutory language of FISA in Section C. Finally, Part II concludes
with a review of the "primary purpose" test, which U.S. Circuit
Courts of Appeals continue to rely upon notwithstanding the exact
language of the statute.
A. The Birth of FISA: A Rejection of WarrantlessElectronic
Surveillance
In a practice begun by President Franklin D. Roosevelt prior to
World War II, U.S. presidents have exercised warrantless electronic
surveillance.6 3 Based on the President's power as Chief Executive, role
as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, and responsibility for
conducting the nation's foreign affairs, 64 the President delegated to the
Attorney General the power to approve electronic surveillance. This
warrantless electronic surveillance program came under judicial
scrutiny in criminal prosecutions in the early 1970s.65
The U.S. Supreme Court initially reviewed the government's
program of warrantless electronic surveillance directed against
domestic organizations.6 6 In United States v. United States District
Court (Keith), the United States charged three defendants with
conspiracy to destroy government property in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
371, including charges against one defendant for the dynamite
bombing of an office of the Central Intelligence Agency in Michigan.67
The U.S. Supreme Court struck down the government's program of
warrantless electronic surveillance directed against domestic
organizations, holding that the Fourth Amendment required a judicial
63. See Robert A. Dawson, Shifting the Balance: The D.C. Circuit and the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1380, 1382 (1993); Gregory E.
Birkenstock, The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act and Standards of Probable Cause: An
AlternativeAnalysis, 80 GEO. L.J. 843, 843-47 (1992).
64. U.S. CONST. art. II, §§ 1-3.
65. See United States v. United States District Court (Keith, J.), 407 U.S. 297 (1972)
[hereinafter Keith].
66. Id. at 299.
67. Id.
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warrant.68 However, the Court made no judgment with regard to the
President's powers to conduct electronic surveillance of foreign powers
and their agents.69 Virtually every court that addressed the issue prior
to the enactment of FISA concluded that the President had the
inherent power to conduct warrantless electronic surveillance for the
purpose of collecting foreign intelligence information, and any such
surveillance constituted an exception to the warrant requirement of the
The Court's justification for the exception
Fourth Amendment."
included: (1) the concern that the President would be unduly
hampered in the performance of his foreign affairs duties; (2) the
strong public interest in the efficient operation of the executive's
foreign policy, which largely depends on a continuous flow of foreign
intelligence information; and (3) the need of the executive to be able to
act with dispatch and secrecy in the area of foreign affairs. 7'
The Court in Keith explicitly limited the scope of its decision to
domestic aspects of national security. 2 The Court stated that the
warrant standards for electronic surveillance contained in the
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (Title III)"3
were not necessarily applicable to the President's powers to meet
domestic threats to the national security." The Court recognized that
domestic security surveillance might involve different policy and
practical considerations from the surveillance of ordinary crime. 5 The
Court suggested that different standards for criminal surveillance and
68. Id.at 321.
69. Id. at 321-22.
70. See United States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593, 605 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied sub nom.,
Ivanov v. United States, 419 U.S. 881 (1974); United States v. Brown, 484 F.2d 418, 426-27 (5th
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 960 (1974); United States v. Clay, 430 F.2d 165 (5th Cir. 1970),
rev'd on other grounds, 403 U.S. 698 (1971).
71. Butenko, 494 F.2d at 605.
72. Keith, 407 U.S. at 321.
73. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act (Title III), 18 U.S.C. § 2510-2520
(1968). The Act allows prosecutors to apply to state judges for wiretapping orders. The Act
requires that persons be protected against unreasonable searches and seizures in conformity with
the Fourth Amendment. Warrants can be issued only with probable cause and a delineation of
who, what, and where will be searched. Id.
74. Keith, 407 U.S. at 322.
75. Id. The court goes on to state:
The gathering of security intelligence is often long range and involves the interrelation
of various sources and types of information. The exact targets of such surveillance
may be more difficult to identify than in surveillance operations against many types of
crime specified in Title III. Often, too, the emphasis of domestic intelligence
gathering is on the prevention of unlawful activity or the enhancement of the
Government's preparedness for some possible future crisis or emergency. Thus, the
focus of domestic surveillance may be less precise than that directed against more
conventional types of crime.
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domestic security might be compatible with the Fourth Amendment if
they were reasonable in light of the government's legitimate need for
intelligence information and the protected rights of citizens.76 In
describing the different standards Congress might employ with regard
to sensitive domestic security cases, the Court laid the groundwork for
FISA by indicating that a request for prior court authorization could
be made to any member of a specially designated court, and that the
time and reporting requirements need not be as strict as those in Title
III. 77
While refusing to set the precise standards required for domestic
security warrants, the Court in Keith held that prior judicial approval
was required for the type of domestic security surveillance involved in
that case and that Congress could proscribe reasonable standards for
such an approval.78 Thus, the Supreme Court's decision in Keith
provided the framework for FISA. In 1978, after several years of
deliberation with the executive branch, Congress enacted the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 197871 modeled on the Keith Court's
opinion.
B. The Truong Decision: The Pre-FISA Requirement of "Primary
Purpose"
Prior to Congress' enactment of FISA, the Fourth Circuit Court
of Appeals first articulated the "primary purpose" test, which is still
relied on by circuit courts when reviewing the propriety of authorized
FISA surveillance.8" In what has become the seminal case on the
subject, the court in United States v. Truong Dinh Hung defined the
scope of the foreign intelligence exception to the Fourth Amendment
76. Id. at 322-23.
77. Id. To get a warrant under Title III, a law enforcement officer must show that (1) law
enforcement officials seeking the warrant demonstrate that the target's activity will, or may,
result in a specific criminal violation; (2) if the standard is met, the judge retains discretion to
reject an application to conduct electronic surveillance even if the judge determines that probable
cause exists; (3) a judge may approve surveillance for only 30 days; and (4) unlike the protection
of secrecy of surveillance in FISA, the government may not use surveillance evidence against a
criminal defendant unless the defendant has been given a copy of both the application for, and
the court order authorizing, the surveillance. These standards differ considerably from FISA
warrant requirements. 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (2000); see also Robert A. Dawson, Shifting the Balance:
The D.C. Circuit and the Foreign Intelligence SurveillanceAct of 1978, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1380, 1393-96 (1993) (Part 2 compares FISA and Title III).
78. Keith, 407 U.S. at 323.
79. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1862 (2000).
80. See United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908, 912-13 (4th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 1144 (1982). The surveillance at issue in the Truong case pre-dated the
enactment of the FISA statute. Thus, the decision relies on the foreign intelligence exception to
the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement, not the FISA statute. Id. at 914-15 n.4.
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warrant requirement. 8 The defendants were convicted of various
espionage-related offenses for transmitting classified United States
government information to representatives of the government of the
Socialist Republic of Vietnam." The defendants appealed, seeking
reversal of their convictions in part due to warrantless surveillance and
searches conducted against them. 3
The court in Truong, using the analytical approach presented in
Keith, held that the government was relieved of seeking a warrant
under the foreign intelligence exception to the Fourth Amendment
only in those situations in which the interests of the executive are
paramount.84 Such situations include: (1) when the object of the
search or surveillance is a foreign power, its agent or collaborators; and
(2) only when the surveillance is conducted "primarily" for foreign
intelligence reasons.8 5
The court in Truong specifically rejected the government's
assertion that if surveillance is to any degree directed at gathering
foreign intelligence, the executive is not subject to the warrant
requirement of the Fourth Amendment.8 6 The "any degree" test was
not the proper test, according to the court, because:
[O]nce surveillance becomes primarily a criminal investigation,
the courts are entirely competent to make the usual probable
cause determination, and ... individual privacy interests come

to the fore and government foreign policy concerns recede when
attempting to form the basis for a
the government is primarily
', 87
prosecution.
criminal
The court similarly rejected the defendant's argument that in
order to protect privacy interests the government should be able to
avoid the warrant requirement only when the surveillance is
conducted "solely" for foreign policy reasons.88 The court stated that
the "solely" test would "fail to give adequate consideration to the
needs and responsibilities of the executive in the foreign intelligence
area."89
Thus, the "primarily" test articulated in Truong defined the
scope of the foreign intelligence exception to the Fourth Amendment.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

See id. at 913-16.
Id. at 911.
Id.
Id. at 915.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 916.
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The court's reliance on this test reflects the judiciary's view that it
adequately balances the protection of personal privacy with the need
to safeguard a nation.
C. The Language of the FISA Statute: "The Purpose"
Prior to its amendment by the Patriot Act, FISA stated in part:
Each application for an order approving electronic surveillance
under this subchapter shall be made by a Federal officer in
writing upon oath or affirmation to a judge having jurisdiction
under section 1803 of this title. Each application shall require
the approval of the Attorney General based upon his finding
that it satisfies the criteria and requirements of such application
as set forth in this subchapter. It shall include (7) a certification or certifications by the Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs or an executive
branch official or officials designated by the President from
among those executive officers employed in the area of
national security or defense and appointed by the President
with the advice and consent of the Senate (B) that the purpose of the surveillance is to obtain
foreign intelligence information;90
Thus, contrary to the test set out in Truong, Congress used "the
purpose" language in drafting FISA. On its face, this language
appears to correspond to the "solely" test argued for by the defendant
in Truong and specifically rejected by that court. However, despite the
explicit text of the FISA statute, and the fact that Truong was a preFISA decision, U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals continued to follow
Truong's rationale and apply the "primary purpose" test when
deciding challenges to FISA searches.91 In essence, the circuit courts
were applying a "primary purpose" test, where the FISA statute on its
face required the higher standard of "the purpose."
D. U.S. Circuit Courts' Continuing Reliance on the "PrimaryPurpose"
90. 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(7)(B) (2000) (emphasis added). In 2001, the Patriot Act amended
this provision to read: "(B) that a significant purpose of the surveillance is to obtain foreign
intelligence information." Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272, 291 (2001).
91. See United States v. Duggan, 743 F.2d 59, 77 (2d Cir. 1984); United States v. Badia,
827 F.2d 1458, 1463-64 (llth Cir. 1987); United States v. Johnson, 952 F.2d 565, 572-73 (1st
Cir. 1991).
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Test
U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals continued to rely on the preFISA "primary purpose" test articulated by Truong in cases
challenging FISA searches despite the statutory language, stating "the
purpose." This section examines opinions issued from the First,
Second, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits, which illustrate the importance
of this requirement to the courts in evaluating the propriety of FISA
surveillance. 2
United States v. Megahey,93 a case from the Second Circuit
consolidated on appeal into United States v. Duggan,94 involved
defendants working clandestinely on behalf of the Provisional Irish
Republican Army to acquire explosives, weapons, ammunition, and
remote-controlled detonation devices in the United States to export to
Northern Ireland for use in terrorist activities.95 The district court
acknowledged that even though the FISA statute recognizes arrest and
prosecution as one of the possible outcomes of a FISA investigation,
surveillance under FISA would nevertheless be appropriate only if
foreign intelligence surveillance was the government's primary
purpose." In affirming the conviction in Megahey, the Second Circuit
emphasized that the purpose of the surveillance in the case was not
directed towards criminal investigation or prosecution, but from the
outset and throughout was to secure foreign intelligence information.9 7
The court stated that the "requirement that foreign intelligence
information be the primary objective of the surveillance is plain."9"
Similarly, in United States v. Badia,99 the Eleventh Circuit Court
of Appeals found that the government had fully complied with the
requirements under FISA where the surveillance "did not have as its
purpose the primary objective of investigating a criminal act" but was
92. Both the government and the FISC agree that the electronic surveillance underlying the
case on appeal was proper. The FISC found that the government had shown probable cause to
believe that the target is an agent of a foreign power and otherwise met the basic requirements of
FISA. The author does not discuss the facts underlying the case on appeal as they have been
redacted from the opinions in the interest of national security. However, the opinion does state
that information contained in the application for surveillance supports the contention that the
target, a U.S. Citizen, is aiding, abetting, or conspiring with others in international terrorism. In
re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 720 (Foreign Intel. Surv. Ct. Rev. 2002).
93. 553 F. Supp. 1180 (E.D.N.Y.1982).
94. 743 F.2d 59 (2d Cir. 1984).
95. Id. at 65.
96. Megahey, 553 F. Supp. at 1189-90.
97. Duggan, 743 F.2d. at 79.
98. Id. at 77 (emphasis added). However, the court did state that a valid FISA surveillance
was not tainted simply because the government could anticipate that the fruits of such
surveillance may later be used, as allowed by § 1806(b), as evidence in a criminal trial. Id.
99. 827 F.2d 1458 (11th Cir. 1987).
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used for the valid purpose of gathering foreign intelligence
information. °0 The defendant in Badia was prosecuted for conspiracy
to manufacture firearms without the approval of the Secretary of the
Treasury stemming from a federal investigation of the militant antiCastro organization known as "Omega-7."1°0
Finally, in United States v. Johnson,1 2 the court interpreted the
language of FISA in § 1804(a)(7)(B)' ° to extend one step further." 4
The court stated that while evidence obtained under FISA subsequently
may be used in criminal prosecutions, the investigation of criminal
activity cannot be the primary purpose of the surveillance."0 ' Johnson
concerned the prosecution of an American citizen who was engaged in
the research and development of explosives including remote-control
bombs for export to the Republic of Ireland and use by the Provisional
Irish Republican Army.0 6 The court's review of the government's
FISA applications indicated that the government's primary purpose
was to obtain foreign intelligence information and not to collect
evidence for criminal prosecution of the defendants.0 7
Additionally, a Ninth Circuit opinion, United States v.
0 ° further supports the proposition that the purpose of
Sarkissian,'
surveillance must be to secure foreign intelligence information.
Sarkissian involved a prosecution stemming from attempts by the FBI
to prevent Armenian terrorists from bombing the Honorary Turkish
Consulate in Philadelphia.0 9 While declining to decide if the proper
test was that of "purpose" or "primary purpose," the court in
Sarkissian stated that the case at issue was "[a]t no point... an
ordinary criminal investigation" and upheld the surveillance." 0 The
court determined that regardless of whether FISA required the
"purpose" or the "primary purpose" of the surveillance to be foreign
intelligence gathering, either standard had been met in this case."'
While refusing "to draw too fine a distinction between criminal and
intelligence investigations," the court stated that the government, as

100. Id. at 1464 (emphasis added).

101.

Id. at 1460-61.

102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

952 F.2d 565 (1st Cir. 1991).
50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(7)(B).
Johnson, 952 F.2d at 572.
Id. at 572.
Id. at 569-70.
Id. at 572.
841 F.2d 959 (9th Cir. 1988).
Id. at 961.
Id. at 965.
Id. at 964.
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provided for in § 1806, may later choose
to prosecute, and that such
112
action would be consistent with FISA.
As the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals' reasoning illustrates,
Sarkissian supports the principle that an ordinary criminal
investigation purpose would be insufficient to uphold FISA
surveillance." 3 While not distinguishing the "purpose" from the
"primary purpose," this case makes clear that if ferreting out criminal
activity, rather than gathering intelligence, were the focus, such a goal
would not suffice for a warrant under FISA but would instead be
subject to Title III's warrant requirements.
What these cases reflect is that existing precedent upholding the
issuance of FISA warrants for electronic surveillance in the area of
foreign intelligence gathering specifically supports the proposition that
gathering evidence for criminal investigations and prosecutions cannot
be the primary purpose of such surveillance.
However, such
information, if resulting from valid FISA surveillance, can be used in
subsequent criminal proceedings consistent with FISA. These courts'
reliance on the "primary purpose" test despite the fact that the statute
uses the language "the purpose" merits two explanations. Either the
various circuit court judges deciding these cases were misreading the
FISA statute to include the "primary purpose" language or, as seems
infinitely more likely, the courts were implying that the "primary
purpose" test was the constitutional minimum required for a FISA
warrant to issue. These courts are clear: the primary purpose of FISA
surveillance cannot be the investigation of criminal activity."'
E. Executive Response to the Judicial Interpretationof "Purpose"
It is apparent that the government recognized the importance the
judiciary placed on the distinction between foreign intelligence
gathering and criminal investigations when determining the purpose
of FISA surveillance. The government's awareness of the "primary
purpose" standard was evidenced by the Attorney General's adoption
of "Procedures for Contacts Between the FBI and the Criminal
Division
Concerning
Foreign
Intelligence
and
Foreign
Counterintelligence Investigations" in 1995."'
These procedures
limited contact between the FBI and the Criminal Division in cases in
which FISA surveillance or searches were being conducted by the FBI
112. Id. at 965.
113. Seeid.
114. United States v. Duggan, 743 F.2d 59, 77 (2d Cir. 1984); United States v. Badia, 827
F.2d 1458, 1463-64 (11th Cir. 1987); United States v. Johnson, 952 F.2d 565, 572-73 (1st Cir.
1991); Sarkissian, 841 F.2d at 965 (9th Cir. 1988).
115. 1995 WL 1946627 (Foreign Intel. Surv. Ct. July 19, 1995).
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for foreign intelligence (FI) or foreign counterintelligence (FCI)
purposes." 6 According to the 1995 procedures, the Criminal Division
should not direct or control the FI or FCI investigations toward law
enforcement objectives in fact or appearance.117 While providing for
significant sharing and coordination between criminal and FI or FCI
investigations, these procedures increasingly became more narrowly
interpreted within the Department of Justice. This led to the
requirement that the Office of Intelligence and Policy Review (OIPR)
act as a "wall" to stop FBI intelligence officials from communicating
8
with the Criminal Division about ongoing FI or FCI investigations."
The Attorney General issued additional, interim procedures in
January 2000."9

In August 2001, the Deputy Attorney General

issued a memorandum further clarifying the 1995 procedures and
Department of Justice policy governing intelligence sharing, and
establishing additional requirements. 120 Finally, in March 2002, the
Attorney General issued additional procedures intended to supersede
the preceding guidelines.' 21
The 2002 procedures reflect the
government's position that greater intelligence sharing is necessary for
the effective use of FISA, and the procedures are consistent with
Patriot Act amendments to the statute. In contrast, the FISC's
position is that FISA surveillances and searches require minimization
procedures designed to "obtain, produce, and disseminate foreign
intelligence information," and not "to enhance the acquisition,
retention and dissemination of evidence for law enforcement
purposes. ' 122 These conflicting views are at the heart of the issue
underlying the FISC's May 2002 opinion and the government's
November 2002 appeal.
116. Id.
117. Seeid.at*2, 6.
118. In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 728 (Foreign Intel. Surv. Ct. Rev. 2002).
119. A May 2000 report by the Attorney General and a July 2001 report by the General
Accounting Office both concluded that concern over federal courts' and the FISC interpretation
of the "primary purpose" test had inhibited necessary coordination between intelligence and law
enforcement officials. Final Report of the Attorney General'sReview Team on the Handling of the
Los Alamos National Laboratory Investigation (AGRT Report), ch. 20 at 721-34,
http://www.fas.org/irp/ops/ci/belows/index.html (May 2000). In response to the AGRT
Report, the Attorney General in January 2000 issued additional interim procedures designed to
address coordination problems identified in the report and augment the 1995 Procedures. Id.;
Memorandum to Recommend that the Attorney General Authorize Certain Measures Regarding
Intelligence Matters in Response to the Interim Recommendations Provided by Special
Litigation Counsel Randy Bellows from Gary G. Grindler, to the Attorney General (Jan. 21,
2000), 2000 WL 33912680 (Foreign Intel. Surv. Ct. Jan. 21, 2000).
120. 2002 WL 1949259, at 1 (Foreign Intel. Surv. Ct. Mar. 6, 2002).
121. Id.
122. In re All Matters Submitted to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, 218 F.
Supp. 2d 611, 623-24 (Foreign Intel. Surv. Ct. 2002) (emphasis omitted).
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III. THE PATRIOT ACT AMENDS FISA LEADING TO THE FISC's
MAY 2002 OPINION

The Patriot Act, passed in October 2001, lowered the standard
required to obtain a FISA warrant by amending the language in §
1804(a)(7)(B) from requiring foreign intelligence collection as the
"primary purpose" to only a "significant purpose."' 2 3
This
amendment meant that the primary purpose no longer needed to be
foreign intelligence gathering, but could now be criminal prosecution
as long as foreign intelligence gathering was still a significant purpose.
From the government's perspective, this change removes the need for
judicial review of the various purposes for gaining a FISA warrant as
long as the court can determine that a significant purpose for the
warrant was foreign intelligence gathering. 4 The government
contended, and the FISA Review Court agreed, that the Patriot Act
amendments specifically altered FISA to make clear that a warrant
application could be obtained even if criminal prosecution was the
primary goal of the surveillance.'
The Patriot Act also added a provision to FISA allowing those
"federal officers who conduct electronic surveillance to acquire foreign
intelligence information" to "consult with Federal law enforcement
officers [in order] to coordinate efforts to investigate or protect
against" attack or other grave hostile acts, sabotage or international
terrorism, or clandestine intelligence activities, by foreign powers or
their agents. 126 Further, such coordination "shall not preclude" either
the government's certification that a significant purpose of the
surveillance is to obtain foreign intelligence information,
or the
7
issuance of an order authorizing the surveillance.1
In November 2001, in response to the first applications filed
under FISA as amended by the Patriot Act, the FISC adopted the
Attorney General's 1995 procedures as augmented by the January
2000 and August 2001 procedures as minimization procedures 128 to

123. Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272, 291 (2001).
124. See also Brief for the United States at 49-56, In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717 (Foreign
Intel. Surv. Ct. Rev. 2002) (No. 02-001).
125. In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 728-29 (Foreign Intel. Surv. Ct. Rev. 2002); Brief for
the United States at 30-56, In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717 (Foreign Intel. Surv. Ct. Rev. 2002)
(No. 02-001).
126. 50 U.S.C. § 1806(k)(1) (2000).
127. Id. § 1806(k)(2).
128. Minimization procedures are designed to limit the acquisition of information that is
not otherwise subject to collection under the statute in light of the needs of the government to
collect foreign intelligence information. 50 U.S.C. § 1801(h) (2000).
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apply in all cases before the Review Court. 129 The court adopted these
guidelines despite the Patriot Act amendments to FISA expressly
sanctioning consultation and coordination between intelligence and
law enforcement officials. 3 '
The Attorney General's differing interpretation of the Patriot
Act led to his approval of new "Intelligence Sharing Procedures,"
intended to implement the Acts's amendments to FISA."3' The 2002
procedures were to supersede the prior procedures, permit the
complete exchange of information and advice between intelligence and
law enforcement officials, eliminate the "direction and control" test,
and allow the exchange of advice between the FBI, the OIPR, and the
Criminal Division regarding "the initiation, operation, continuation or
expansion of FISA searches or surveillance."' 3 2 In March 2002, the
government filed a motion with the FISC informing it of the Justice
Department's adoption of the 2002 procedures, proposing those
procedures be followed in all matters before the FISC, and asking the
FISC to vacate its orders adopting the prior procedures as
minimization procedures in all cases and imposing special "wall"
procedures'3 3 in certain cases to prevent consultation and coordination
between intelligence and law enforcement personnel.' 34
Again, the FISC was not persuaded by the Attorney General's
interpretation of the Patriot Act and ordered the 2002 procedures
adopted with modifications.' 3 5 Those modifications were essentially a
denial of the government's motion, the appeal of which is the subject
of the FISA Review Court opinion discussed below.'36 Importantly,
the FISC expressly limited its disposition of this case to addressing the
proposed 2002 procedures and did not address potential constitutional
issues raised by the Patriot Act amendment of the significant purpose
language. "'
129. In re All Matters Submitted to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, 218 F.
Supp. 2d 611, 613 (Foreign Intel. Surv. Ct. 2002).
130. Id.; Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272, 291 (2001).
131. In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 729; Memorandum of Intelligence Sharing Procedures,
supra note 27.
132. 2002 WL 1949259, at 1-3 (Foreign Intel. Surv. Ct. Rev. Mar. 6, 2002).
133. In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 729.
134. In re All Matters Submitted to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, 218 F. Supp.
2d at 615-16.
135. Id.at625.
136. See In reSealed Case, 310 F.3d at 721.
137. In re All Matters Submitted to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, 218 F. Supp.
2d at 614. This is consistent with the general principle that courts should not address
constitutional issues when unnecessary. Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846 (1985) (A fundamental
rule of judicial restraint requires that federal courts, prior to reaching any constitutional question,
must consider nonconstitutional grounds for decision.).
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IV. THE FISA REVIEW COURT'S NOVEMBER 2002 OPINION
The FISA Review Court convened for the first time in its
twenty-five-year history to hear the government's appeal of the FISC's
May 2002 ruling.'
As provided for in FISA, the government is the
only party to a FISA proceeding (the defendant is not present nor
represented at a FISA hearing).'3 9 The government made two
arguments in its appeal. First, the government argued that the
supposed pre-Patriot Act limitation in FISA restricting the
government's intention to use foreign intelligence information in
criminal prosecutions was an illusion unsupported by both the
language of FISA and its legislative history. 4 ° In making this
argument, the government claimed that the several appellate court
decisions upholding FISA surveillance only if the government's
primary purpose in pursuing foreign intelligence information was not
for criminal prosecution were incorrect in that contention, if not
incorrect in their holdings.'
Second, and alternatively, the
government contended that even if the "primary purpose" test was a
legitimate construction of FISA prior to the passage of the Patriot Act,
that Act's amendments to FISA eliminated that concept, 42 leaving the
"significant purpose" test as the standard.
Additionally, the
government's brief set forth the view that the "primary purpose" test
is not required by the Fourth Amendment, while the American Civil
Liberties Union (ACLU) and National Association of Criminal
Defense Lawyers (NACDL) amici briefs argued the contrary-that
the FISA statute is unconstitutional unless government surveillance
applications under FISA are denied if the primary purpose of the
surveillance is criminal prosecution.' 43
The Review Court, after analyzing several of the circuit court
cases mentioned above, determined that these courts adopted the
"primary purpose" test without any tie to statutory language in FISA

138. The FISA Review Court is provided for by statute. 50 U.S.C. § 1803(b) (2000).
139. Id. § 1804 (2000).
140. In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 721-22. This argument was raised for the first time in
this appeal. Because proceedings before the FISC and the Review Court are ex parte-not
adversary-the Review Court can entertain arguments supporting the government's position not
presented to the lower court. Id. at 722 n.6.
141. Id. at 722.
142. Id.
143. Id. While this view is contended in the government's brief, it is not an actual
argument raised on appeal. Id. The FISA Review Court accepted a brief filed by the ACLU
and joined by the Center for Democracy and Technology, Center for National Security Studies,
Electronic Privacy Information Center, and Electronic Frontier Foundation, and a brief filed by
the NACDL as amici curiae, in addition to the government's brief. See id. at 719.
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requiring such a test. 144 Further, the Review Court pointed out that
the FISC did not refer to any specific statutory language requiring the
"primary purpose" test.14 The Review Court thereby concluded that
the version of FISA passed in 1978 did not prohibit or limit the
government's use or proposed use of foreign intelligence information
in a criminal prosecution. 146 Continuing its analysis, the Review
Court stated that the FISC erred in failing to consider the legal
significance of the Patriot Act amendments to FISA specifically
designed to make clear that an application could be obtained even if
criminal prosecution was the primary goal.'47
The FISC instead imposed the disputed restrictions on FISA's
use in criminal prosecutions using its statutory authority to approve
"minimization procedures," procedures designed "to prevent the
acquisition, retention, and dissemination within the government of
material gathered in an electronic surveillance that is unnecessary to
the government's need for foreign intelligence information. '148 A
FISA judge may approve electronic surveillance if he finds that
proposed minimization procedures meet the definition of
minimization procedures contained in § 1801(h) of FISA. 149 The
Review Court concluded that the FISC, in adopting portions of the
Attorney General's augmented 1995 procedures, "misinterpreted and
50
misapplied" the minimization procedures it is entitled to impose.1
The Review Court went on to say that this action by the FISC may
have exceeded the constitutional limits of an Article III court.' 5'
Next, the Review Court determined that FISA as amended by
the Patriot Act does not oblige the government to demonstrate to the
FISC that its primary purpose in conducting electronic surveillance is
not criminal prosecution.5 2 To support this holding, the Review
Court relied on Congress' clear legislative intent to relax the
requirement that the government show that its primary purpose was
15 3
something other than criminal prosecution.

144. See id.
at 725-27.
145. See id. at 721.
146. Id. at 727.
147. See id. at 730-32.
148. Id. at 721.
149. 50 U.S.C. §1805(a)(4).
150. InreSealed Case, 310 F.3d at 731.
151. Id. Under Article III, federal courts have original jurisdiction in cases based on
diversity of citizenship, and in cases that involve domestic or maritime federal law or treaties
between the United States and other nations. U.S. CONST. art. III, §2.
152. In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 736.
153. See id. at 732.

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 27:623

However, the Review Court makes clear that the Patriot Act, by
using the term "significant purpose," implies that another purpose is
to be distinguished from a foreign intelligence purpose."5 4 In other
words, the Review Court stated that when Congress passed the
"significant purpose" language, it accepted the dichotomy between
foreign intelligence and law enforcement that the government
5
contended was false in its appeal, a dichotomy that began in Truong."'
Thus, the Review Court held that the "significant purpose" test
excludes a sole objective of criminal prosecution, but is satisfied if the
government has a realistic option of dealing with the target other than
through criminal prosecution even if the primary purpose was criminal
prosecution."5 6 In sum, the Review Court agreed with both of the
government's arguments on appeal..
Finally, the Review Court considered whether the statute as
amended is consistent with the Fourth Amendment provisions
regarding search and seizure." 7 It is clear that Congress intended the
Patriot Act amendments to FISA to allow authorities to proceed with
surveillance under FISA if a significant purpose of the investigation is
to collect foreign intelligence. 5 8 This significant purpose language is
intended to make it easier for law enforcement to obtain a FISA search
or surveillance warrant for those cases in which the subject of the
surveillance is both a potential source of foreign intelligence
information and the potential target of criminal prosecution.5 9 While
Congress' purpose behind this amendment is clear, the
constitutionality of the "significant purpose" language remains
uncertain.
In analyzing this issue, the Review Court compared the Supreme
Court's special needs cases involving random stops (seizures) as the
closest available analogy to the electronic searches covered under
FISA."6 ° Similar to the rationale behind FISA, the Supreme Court's
approval of warrantless and suspicionless special needs searches is
based on the distinction between ordinary criminal prosecutions and
154. Id. at 734.
155. See id. at 734-35; see also supra Part II.B.
156. In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 735.
157. Id. at 736-46.
158. 147 CONG. REC. S11004, S10992 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 2001) (statement of Sen. Leahy);
147 CONG. REC. S10591 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 2001) (statement of Sen. Feinstein).
159. 147 CONG. REC. S10591 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 2001) (statement of Sen. Feinstein).
160. The Review Court found that because a random stop is not based on particular
suspicion such stops could be seen as greater encroachments into personal privacy than FISA
electronic surveillance. However, the Review Court also acknowledged that wire-tapping is more
intrusive than an automobile stop accompanied by questioning. In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at
746.
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extraordinary situations."'
Examples of extraordinary 62 situations
include border security and apprehension of drunk drivers.
The Review Court analyzed City of Indianapolis v. Edmond,163 a
recent special needs case relied on by both amici and the government.
In Edmond, the Supreme Court held that the special needs exception
did not include a highway checkpoint designed to catch drug dealers
because the government's "primary purpose" was merely "to uncover
evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing. ' 164 The "severe and
intractable nature of the drug problem" was not sufficient justification
for a warrantless, suspicionless search, and the Court stated that "the
gravity of the threat alone cannot be dispositive of questions
concerning what means law enforcement officers may employ to a
pursue a given purpose."' 65 However, the Court did acknowledge that
an appropriately tailored roadblock could be used "to thwart an
imminent terrorist attack. 16 6 Of critical importance to the Court in
Edmond was that the nature of the emergency or threat could remove
the matter from the realm of ordinary crime control, thereby entitling
it to the special needs exception of a warrantless, suspicionless
67
search. 1
Analogous to the distinction drawn in Edmond, the Review Court
stated that FISA's purpose has been distinct from "ordinary crime
control" since its inception. The court concluded that the standards
under FISA either meet or "certainly come close" to meeting the
minimum Fourth Amendment warrant standards. 168 While the
Supreme Court in Edmond stated that the threat to society was not
dispositive in determining the reasonableness of a search or seizure, it
established that it was a critical factor.'69 The Review Court stated
that, in light of terrorism, the threat FISA addresses is certainly
serious-if not the most serious the country faces. 7 ° Thus, the
Review Court believes that FISA, as amended by the Patriot Act, is
constitutional when applying the balancing test from Keith because
161. Id.at 745.
162. Id.
163. 531 U.S. 32 (2000).
164. Id. at 41-42.
165. Id. at 42. The Review Court was careful to distinguish that the "purpose" to which
the court in Edmond was referring was not a subjective intent, which is not relevant in ordinary
Fourth Amendment probable cause analysis, but instead to a programmatic purpose (i.e.
whether the purpose of the checkpoint was ordinary law enforcement or an extraordinary
situation like border security). See In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 745.

166. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 44.
167. See id.

168. In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 746.
169. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 42.
170. In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 746.
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the surveillances it authorizes are reasonable. 17 ' However, the Review
Court admitted "the constitutional question presented by this casewhether Congress' disapproval of the primary purpose test is
consistent with the Fourth Amendment-has no definitive
jurisprudential answer. "172
As the preceding discussion illustrates, the Review Court
analyzed a broad range of issues in disposing of this case. The court
addressed both issues raised on appeal by the government: (1) whether
the pre-Patriot Act restrictions on FISA's use in criminal prosecutions
were required; and (2) whether the Patriot Act amendments
eliminated the "primary purpose" test requirement for upholding
Additionally, the court addressed the
warrants under FISA.
constitutionality of FISA as amended by the Patriot Act, a view
addressed in the briefs but not raised as an issue on appeal. The
Review Court's extensive scope of review may prove detrimental to
FISA's future.
V. RAMIFICATIONS OF THE REVIEW COURT OPINION

The Review Court's broad opinion differs from circuit court
precedent and effectively provides a roadmap and ammunition for a
defendant's challenge of FISA, in turn endangering national security
by putting FISA in jeopardy and increasing the possibility that
sensitive national security information will be released to defendants.
A. The FISA Review Court Exceeded the Necessary Scope of Review
The Review Court exceeded well-accepted principles of judicial
restraint when deciding this case, excessiveness that in the long run
may prove very damaging for FISA. First, it is a well-accepted
principle of judicial action that reviewing courts should limit their
73
determinations to issues essential to the decision of the case at hand.
Second, a fundamental rule of judicial restraint requires that federal
courts must consider nonconstitutional grounds for a decision prior to
reaching any constitutional question. 4
Admittedly, the constitutionality of the "significant purpose"
language is an open question. This would be true regardless of the
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. United States v. Alaska S.S. Co., 253 U.S. 113 (1920) (The U.S. Supreme Court will
determine only actual matters in controversy essential to the decision of the particular case before
it, and where by an act of the parties or a subsequent law the existing controversy has come to an
end the case becomes moot, and will be treated accordingly, however convenient it might be to
have the questions decided for the government of future cases.).
174. See Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846 (1985).
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FISC's prudent choice to limit its decision to amending the proposed
2002 procedures and the Review Court's inconclusive analysis of that
issue on appeal. Even if the Review Court limited its holding to the
decision that the FISC lacked the power to amend the 2002
procedures, thereby overruling the lower court's decision, the
"significant purpose" test enacted by Congress and the 2002
procedures would nevertheless be in effect. However, precedent
would still be intact, at least to the extent that the cases had not been
formally addressed by a court as being inconsistent with the
"significant purpose" test, and the entire review would likely have
been subjected to much less media scrutiny and coverage. Thus, a
limited holding could have adequately disposed of this appeal without
the negative effects resulting from the court's broader disposition.
The Review Court's expansive decision provided an outcome that was
no different substantively than a narrower disposition of the case
would have achieved, but needlessly created substantial hurdles to
FISA's future use.
In fact, the Review Court did dispose of the narrower issue. As
discussed above in Part IV, the Review Court held that the FISC
incorrectly applied minimization procedures it was entitled to impose
in amending the 2002 procedures.'7 5 Further, the court goes on to say
that in doing so "the FISA court may well have exceeded the
constitutional bounds that restrict an Article III court."' 76 This
holding would have adequately disposed of the appeal, resulting in the
same substantive outcome as the Review Court's broad review (the
"significant purpose" language would be in effect and the 2002
procedures would be intact).' 77 Because addressing additional issues
did not change the substantive outcome of the case, the broad scope of
the Review Court's decision was unnecessary.
Furthermore, there was absolutely no need to address the
government's first argument, whether FISA before the Patriot Act
amendment required the "primary purpose" test. It is confusing why
the government even wanted to raise this argument. Whether the
"primary purpose" test was a legitimate requirement under FISA
before it was amended by the Patriot Act seems completely irrelevant
to the question of what FISA requires as amended. Thus, if the
Review Court was intent on addressing any issue beyond a strict
overruling of the lower court opinion, it should have at least limited its
175. Inre Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 731.
176. Id.
177. While the Review Court does state that it was error for the lower court to refuse to
consider the legal significance of the Patriot Act amendments to FISA, it gives no reason why this
exercise of judicial restraint was erroneous. See id. at 732.
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analysis to an exploration of the government's second issue, whether
FISA as amended requires the "primary purpose" test.
Finally, the Review Court's decision to discuss the additional
matter of the constitutionality of FISA as amended by the Patriot Act
seems particularly unsound given that the Review Court admits it is a
question without a definitive answer. 17' This admission amplifies the
Court's violation of the principle that federal courts should consider
non-constitutional grounds for a decision prior to reaching any
constitutional questions, particularly where, as here, the Court had
ample other grounds on which to resolve the case. The Review Court
should have resolved this appeal without addressing the constitutional
question presented.
B. The Broad Scope of Review Undermined Consistent Precedent
Upholding FISA Warrants
The Review Court's failure to limit its holding to merely
overturning the FISC's May 2002 ruling unnecessarily discredited
consistent U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals precedent in disposing of
this case. This precedent consistently upheld warrants under FISA
when the primary purpose of the surveillance was foreign intelligence
gathering, not primarily criminal investigation. 179 As discussed above
in Part II.D, circuit court opinions upholding FISA warrants implied
that the surveillance was constitutional only where the primary
purpose was foreign intelligence gathering and not criminal
This implied requirement for constitutionality
investigation.
stemmed from the courts' reliance on the "primary purpose" test
despite the fact that the test was not explicitly required in the statute
or legislative history.
In contrast, the Review Court agreed with the government's
argument in holding that the pre-Patriot Act limitation in FISA
restricting the government's intention to use foreign intelligence
information in criminal prosecutions has no basis in the FISA statute
or legislative history. The court specifically states that the circuit
courts' reliance on this concept is incorrect and unfounded. The
Review Court concluded that the circuit court precedent relying on
the "primary purpose" test did not tie that test to any statutory
language. 8 ° According to the court, "FISA as passed by Congress in
178. Id.at 746.
179. United States v. Duggan, 743 F.2d 59, 77 (2d Cir. 1984); United States v. Badia, 827
F.2d 1458, 1463-64 (11th Cir. 1987); United States v. Johnson, 952 F.2d 565, 572-73 (1st Cir.
1991).
180. In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 726.
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1978 clearly did not preclude or limit the government's use or
proposed use of foreign intelligence information ... in a criminal

prosecution. 1.. This finding clearly undercuts existing circuit court
precedent establishing that the investigation of criminal activity
cannot be the primary purpose of FISA surveillance.
The Review Court holding disregards the importance, even if
implied, that the circuit courts placed on the "primary purpose" test.
The courts implied the test was critical to the justification for, and
constitutionality of, a FISA warrant by continuing to require that test
be met even though it was not specifically provided for in the statute.
Further, in making this argument the Justice Department undermined
precedent it may well need in future cases in order to prohibit both a
defendant's review of FISA warrant application materials and a
defendant's attack against FISA's constitutionality.
The Justice Department could have attempted to argue that
while a significant purpose was foreign intelligence gathering, another
significant purpose was criminal prosecution, which would imply that
neither purpose was primary. This characterization may have allowed
the government to argue that such surveillance was justified even
under the amended "significant purpose" requirement because the
"primary purpose" was not criminal prosecution.
This "dual
significant purpose" characterization is arguably consistent with
82
circuit court precedent, particularly Johnson."
However, this
argument would likely appear disingenuous following the FISA
Review Court appeal because the Justice Department specifically
contends in its brief that "FISA may be used primarily, or exclusively,
to obtain evidence for a prosecution designed to protect the United
States against foreign spies and terrorists," and that "FISA may be
used primarily to obtain evidence for a prosecution if the government
also has a significant non-law enforcement foreign intelligence
purpose."' 3 Additionally, the government argued specifically that the
circuit courts' reliance on the "primary purpose" test was misplaced." 4
Thus, the Review Court opinion has highlighted the potential
inconsistency between the "primary purpose" and "significant
purpose" tests for a defendant and removed any chance the
Department may have had of arguing that the precedent was
181. Id. at 727 (emphasis omitted).
182. 952 F.2d at 572-73 (holding that evidence obtained under FISA may subsequently be
used in criminal prosecutions, but that the investigation of criminal activity cannot be the
primary purpose of the surveillance).
183. Brief for the United States at 30, 49, In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717 (Foreign Intel.
Surv. Ct. Rev. 2002) (No. 02-001).
184. In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 722.
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nonetheless consistent with the "significant purpose" language of
FISA, as amended.
C. The Review Court's Decision Identifies a Defendant'sArgument for
Access to FISA Application Materials
Even if FISA as amended is ultimately upheld, the defendant
could do considerable damage to the Justice Department's
counterintelligence program merely by challenging the sufficiency of a
FISA application. The Review Court's analysis, in particular its
discrediting of precedent and the publicity surrounding the opinion,
increases a defendant's chance for success in making such a challenge.
A defendant in a criminal proceeding can, as provided for in
FISA, challenge the legitimacy of FISA-warranted surveillance and
the admissibility of evidence obtained under that surveillance."' 5 The
court may then conduct an in camera ex parte review, a process which,
to date, has denied defendants access to documentation supporting a
FISA application.' 8 6 Where the Attorney General claims that national
security interests are at stake, such an in camera ex parte review has
been held sufficient to determine the legality of the surveillance. 87 In
that review, the court determines whether the surveillance was
warranted. The court has historically based this determination on
whether or not the primary purpose was foreign intelligence
investigation and, at a minimum, has required that the primary
These reviews have
purpose not be criminal investigation.'
consistently led to refusals to turn over FISA application materials to
defendants.8 9
Following its successful appeal, the Justice Department will
pursue surveillance warrants under FISA as amended by the Patriot
Act: primarily to obtain evidence for criminal prosecution where the
185. 50 U.S.C. § 1806(e) (2000).
186. Id. § 1806(f).
187. United States v. Duggan, 743 F.2d 59, 78 (2d Cir. 1984); United States v. Badia, 827
F.2d 1458, 1464 (11th Cir. 1987).
188. Duggan, 743 F.2d at 77; Badia, 827 F.2d at 1463-64; Johnson, 952 F.2d at 572-73;
United States v. Sarkissian, 841 F.2d 959, 965 (9th Cir. 1988).
189. Duggan, 743 F.2d at 78 (holding that the district court did not err in refusing to
disclose the substance of FISA warrant applications where the purpose of the surveillance was to
obtain information on the defendant, who played a leadership role in a known international
terrorist organization, even if fruits of the surveillance might later be used as criminal evidence);
Badia, 827 F.2d at 1464 (otherwise valid FISA surveillance is not tainted and does not need to be
disclosed to the defendant merely because the government may later use the information
obtained as evidence in a criminal trial; here, where the defendant was an agent of a foreign
power who had participated in terrorist attacks on behalf of a known international terrorism
group, the district court did not err in refusing to disclose the FISA warrant application to the
defendant in order to determine the legality of the surveillance).
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government also has a significant foreign intelligence purpose. 9 '
Despite the Review Court's contrary holding, controlling circuit court
precedent still requires the "primary purpose" test. 191 Thus, the
Justice Department's reliance as a result of the Review Court opinion
on the "significant purpose" test provides a defendant in such a case a
potentially valid challenge to the justification for FISA surveillance
and the admissibility of resulting evidence because the warrant
application's primary purpose was criminal investigation, while
foreign intelligence gathering was merely a secondary purpose. A
district court judge may find a defendant's request for access to FISA
application materials to determine whether the primary purpose was in
fact criminal investigation more deserving of merit following the
Review Court opinion for several reasons.
First, the Review Court opinion, as discussed in Part IV above,
highlights the disparity between the "significant purpose" test and the
"primary purpose" test. It also indicates the Justice Department's
view that the "primary purpose" test is not required and criminal
prosecution can be a primary purpose of FISA surveillance. Further,
the Review Court opinion highlights the circuit courts' reliance on the
"primary purpose" test. A district court judge, therefore, may feel a
defendant is more likely to prevail in a showing that the surveillance
had criminal prosecution as its primary purpose and deserves access to
FISA application materials to prove that allegation; a result for which
no precedent exists under current circuit court case law.'92
190. In fact, these prosecutions, which rely on FISA warrants issued after the Patriot Act
amendments took effect, are presently coming up for adjudication. In a case involving what has
become known as the "Portland Seven," a group of U.S. citizens charged with attempting to
travel to Afghanistan in order to serve the Taliban and AI-Qaida, the court in United States v.
Battle, 2003 WL 751155 (D. Or. Feb. 25, 2003), has been asked to review the constitutionality
of evidence obtained under FISA as amended by the Patriot Act to allow for the gathering of
evidence of criminal activity, not just foreign intelligence information. Press Release, American
Civil Liberties Union, Government Is Illegally Using Evidence from Secret Court Wiretaps in
http://www.acluat
19,
2003),
(Sept.
Charges
ACLU
Cases,
Criminal
or.org/litigation/FISAReleaseO9l903.htm; see also, e.g., Associated Press, Oregon Case
at
NEWS,
CABLE
NORTHWEST
Patriot Act,
"Spy
Court,"
Challenges
25,
(Feb.
http://www.nwcn.com/topstories/NW_022503ORNterrorarrests.57b468a.html
2003); Anita Ramasastry, Recent Oregon Ruling on Secret Warrants May Set Troublesome
Precedent, FINDLAW, at http://www.cnn.com/2003/LAW/03/18/findlaw.analysis.ram
asastry.warrant/index.html (March 18, 2003) (referring to Battle, 2003 WL 751155).
191. While the precedential value of the FISA Review Court's opinion is unknown, it is
unlikely that it will prove to be controlling authority in U.S. circuit court cases. Brooklyn Law
School Professor Susan Herman stated that the FISA Review Court opinion "doesn't have
precedent-setting authority .... But a district judge considering this question would look at this
opinion." Jay Weaver, Tampa Trial Will Test Antiterrorism Law, MIAMI HERALD, March 17,
2003, at B1.
192. See, e.g., Duggan, 743 F.2d at 77; Badia, 827 F.2d at 1463-64; Johnson, 952 F.2d at
572-73; Sarkissian, 841 F.2d at 965.
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Second, the government, as discussed above in Part V.B, is in
effect precluded from arguing any common ground between the two
tests given its position in the FISA appeal that the circuit courts were
incorrect to ever require the "primary purpose" test. In pursuing that
argument on appeal, the government would appear disingenuous
changing its story once it is in front of a federal district court.
Third, the district court judge may have heightened concern over
the forthrightness of U.S. intelligence agencies in seeking FISA
warrants. The FISC and Review Court opinions brought to light
seventy-five instances of inaccurate FBI affidavits in FISA
applications.19 3
These misrepresentations involved assertions
regarding information shared with criminal investigators and

prosecutors.'94 One FBI agent was barred from appearing before the

FISC as an affiant,' 95 and as of November 2002, FBI agent or agents
involved were still under investigation by the Department of Justice's
Office of Professional Responsibility.'96 Publicity of these mistakes
may increase a district court judge's resolve to allow defendants access
to FISA application papers and evidentiary hearings, a practice that
while provided for in FISA, has never been found necessary. Finally,
the district court judge may feel bound to err on the side of the
defendant given the intense publicity currently surrounding the FISC
and the Review Court's historic opinions. For example, a district
court judge may decide that in fairness to the defendant, an in camera
ex parte review is not sufficient, and the defendant should have the
ability to review the application materials himself.
This disclosure would be a critical loss for the government. The
release of such information to defendants could profoundly impact
national security. The applications would reveal counterintelligence
information, including secret sources and methods relied on by
intelligence officers, which could severely compromise the future use
of those methods and informants. Further, if the disclosure of FISA
application materials to defendants becomes commonplace, the
underlying purpose behind FISA cannot be achieved.' 97 If enough
193. In re All Matters Submitted to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, 218 F.
Supp. 2d 611, 620-21 (Foreign Intel. Surv. Ct. 2002); In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 729-30
n.18 (Foreign Intel. Surv. Ct. Rev. 2002).
194. In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 729-30 n.18.
195. In re All Matters Submitted to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, 218 F. Supp.
2d at 621.
196. In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 729-30 n.18.
197. The FISC opinion states:
Examination of the... [FISA] statute leaves little doubt that the collection of foreign
intelligence information is the raison d'etre for the FISA ....
Clearly this court's
jurisdiction is limited to granting orders for electronic surveillances and physical
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methods and sources are revealed to defendants, intelligence officers
will no longer be able to collect foreign intelligence information
through clandestine surveillance, a key purpose of FISA.
D. The Review Court Opinion ProvidesGrounds on which FISA's
ConstitutionalityCan Be Challenged
The Review Court opinion provides a roadmap for a
constitutional challenge of FISA as amended by the Patriot Act. It
achieves this dubious accomplishment by highlighting and disagreeing
with case law on which a defendant may rely in challenging FISA's
constitutionality and in admitting the question is one without a
definitive jurisprudential answer.
Within its analysis, the Review Court opinion identifies the
precedent and argument on which a defendant should premise his or
her constitutional attack of FISA. In disagreeing with long-standing,
consistent, circuit court precedent, the opinion makes clear the
distinctions between the "significant purpose" test and the "primary
purpose" test. The court says that the circuit courts were wrong to
require the "primary purpose" test when it was not explicitly provided
for in the legislative history behind the passage of FISA or the
language of the statute itself.198 The Review Court opinion analyzes
circuit court holdings premised on the "primary purpose" test, making
clear that those courts did in fact require the "primary purpose" test
despite the Review Court's determination that the test was not
explicitly required. This analysis highlights for a defendant the
potential argument, including precedent supporting that argument,
that FISA as amended by the Patriot Act may be inconsistent with
circuit court precedent and unconstitutional because it fails to require
the "primary purpose" test: FISA as amended allows criminal
prosecution to be the primary purpose of the surveillance.
After determining that FISA as amended does not oblige the
government to prove that its primary purpose in conducting electronic
surveillance is not criminal prosecution when applying to the FISC (in
contrast to existing precedent), the Review Court states it is "obliged
to consider whether the statute as amended is consistent with the
'
This entire section of the Review Court
Fourth Amendment."199
searches for the collection of foreign intelligence information under the standards and
procedures prescribed in the Act.
In re All Matters Submitted to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, 218 F. Supp. 2d at 61314.
198. In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 725-27.
199. Id. at 736.
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opinion is an unnecessary foray into the disposition of a constitutional
question that was not specifically raised by the appellant in this case. 20
Furthermore, it is inconsistent with fundamental principles of judicial
review as discussed above in Part V.A.2 1 In this gratuitous analysis,
the Review Court admits that it is an open question whether
Congress' amendment to FISA removing the "primary purpose" test
is constitutional.0 2 The court concludes that in its opinion the
amended statute likely does not violate the Fourth Amendment.2 3
However, the Review Court admits that congresspersons like
Senator Leahy, a drafter of the Patriot Act amendment, recognized
that "no matter what statutory change is made ... the court may

impose a constitutional requirement of 'primary purpose' based on the
appellate court decisions upholding FISA against constitutional
challenges over the past 20 years. "204 Therefore, critical questions in
such a challenge are whether the circuit courts would find the FISA
Review Court opinion persuasive or whether the circuit courts would
reach a similar conclusion on their own. 205 This outcome seems
doubtful given the circuit courts' consistent reliance on the "primary
purpose" test despite the fact it was not explicitly provided for in the
statute; a fact emphasized in the Review Court opinion. Regardless,
the Review Court's explicit statement that the constitutionality of
FISA as amended is unknown has encouraged an attack of the
amended statute's constitutionality.
VI. CONCLUSION: IN WINNING THE BATTLE THE JUSTICE

DEPARTMENT MAY HAVE LOST THE WAR
The Justice Department fought for expanded powers under
FISA to fight terrorism. Congress, through Patriot Act amendments,
explicitly sought to expand powers granted under FISA through its
use of the "significant purpose" language. However, U.S. Circuit
Courts of Appeals have upheld FISA only when the narrower
"primary purpose" test is applied, which requires that the primary
200. While the government and amicus briefs address their respective views regarding the
constitutionality of FISA as amended by the Patriot Act, this was not one of the government's
two issues on appeal. In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 721-22. Therefore, the Review Court could
have disposed of the case without addressing this matter, and should have under accepted
principles of judicial review.
201. United States v. Jean, 472 U.S. 846 (1985).
202. In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 746.
203. See id.
204. Id. at 737 (alteration in original) (citing 147 CONG. REC. S11003 (Oct. 25, 2001)).
205. See David L. Hudson, Jr., Unusual Appeals Process in Wiretap Case, ABA J. EReport, Nov. 22, 2002, at WL 1 No. 45 ABAJEREP 1 (stating that the Review Court's
constitutional holding may not be binding in ordinary federal courts).
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purpose of FISA surveillance not be criminal investigation. The
Justice Department successfully convinced the FISA Review Court
that FISA never required the "primary purpose" test, that the Patriot
Act amendments to FISA eliminate the "primary purpose" test, and
that FISA as amended by the Patriot Act is constitutional. The
Review Court agreed with the government, and in its disposition of
the case the court exceeded the scope of review necessary to effectively
resolve the government's appeal.
This broad scope of review directly undermined precedent on
which the government has historically relied for upholding warrants
issued under FISA. Further, the Review Court's decision, including
its disagreement with existing precedent, makes plain a defendant's
argument for access to FISA application materials. The strength of
this argument is exacerbated by the publicity this decision received,
including publicity of abuse by FBI officers in seeking FISA warrants,
and the renewed strength of a defendant's challenge of a FISA warrant
under the "significant purpose" test. This publicity and new test may
coalesce to make a district court judge more sympathetic to a
defendant's need to see FISA application materials. The decision also
makes plain grounds on which FISA's constitutionality can be
challenged.
Certainly, the government's motivation for broadening its
abilities to use FISA, the prevention of terrorism, is a laudable goal.
However, the government's choice to argue broad and constitutional
issues on appeal combined with the Review Court's expansive scope of
review may ultimately lead to attacks that will undermine the statute.
While the government at present has won the battle for the use of
FISA where a significant purpose of the desired surveillance is a
criminal investigation, the government may have lost the war by
jeopardizing the FISA statute itself, an effective and important tool in
the war on terrorism and the protection of national security.

